

CPYRGHT

## EDITORIAL PAGE

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## The CIA: Who Watches the Watchdog?

In heavily guarded offices at 2430 E. Street in Washington, on the grounds of the old naval hospital there, this nation's Central Intelligence Agency directs the most secret and least publicized operations of the United States government. Not even the Atomic Energy Commission functions with the secrecy of the CIA; the taxpayers know *something* of atomic research—how much it costs, in general how well it is succeeding, where the principal work is being done.

Of the CIA, whose expenditures are reckoned by well-informed observers at something in the neighborhood of \$1,000,000,000 a year, the taxpayer knows nothing.

This almost invisible agency of the government came into existence in 1947, as the successor to an unwieldy central intelligence "group" that was organized after World War II. By way of background, it should be noted that prior to World War II, there was no American intelligence agency; we relied largely upon the reports of diplomatic and military officers, openly gathered at consulates and embassies around the world. During the war, the cloak-and-dagger Office of Secret Services was set up to direct American espionage, but this went out of existence with the end of hostilities.

The National Security Act of 1947, creating the CIA, gave the new body some simple—and sweeping—duties. The CIA is "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government." By one provision, it is specifically directed that the "Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Even the sweeping terms of this enactment were regarded as inadequate by the CIA. So in June, 1949, the administration obtained from Congress one of the most amazing laws ever put on the books—Public Law 110 of the Eighty-first Congress. This is the law that makes CIA almost literally a law unto itself.

By this enactment, CIA is made exempt from all rules of purchasing that apply to other agencies. It may hire and fire at will, without regard to Civil Service regulations. All provisions of law and all regulations "relating to the expenditure of government funds" are specifically waived for the CIA. It is above "any law" that might require "the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, numbers of personnel employed by the Agency." The Director of the Bureau of

the Budget is flatly instructed to make "no reports to the Congress" of CIA's expenditures, either lump sum or itemized. CIA spends what it pleases, as it pleases, "solely on the certificate of the director, and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified." No ordinary Congressman can touch it; no ordinary citizen is even admitted to the CIA's office.

For all the taxpayers know, the CIA may be doing an appallingly inefficient job. It may be wasting millions of dollars in fantastically extravagant and unnecessary schemes. It may be needlessly duplicating the work of other agencies. It may be the worst run bureaucracy in Washington. Westbrook Pegler has made the flat and unqualified charge that the CIA "slipped subsidies of millions of dollars to the AFL, [David] Dubinsky, the Garment Workers Union, and a mysterious group of persons unknown," in some nebulous venture to strengthen free trade unions in Europe against Communist infiltration. This charge the CIA neither affirms nor denies; it simply evades answering.

From what little has been printed about the CIA, it is known that the agency has had its internal difficulties. In October, 1947, several employees were fired as "bad security risks." On another occasion, Senator McCarthy charged (with apparent accuracy) that a pervert dismissed from the State Department had turned up on CIA's payroll. The agency came in for severe criticism when South Korea was invaded—to this nation's total surprise—in June, 1950, and again the following Fall when the size of the Chinese Communist intervention was tragically underestimated. CIA was badly mouse-trapped last year, when it swallowed a false tip that Owen Lattimore was about to skip the country for Russia.

The extent of CIA's successful efforts is understandably unknown; in common with intelligence services everywhere, the agency never mentions its successes. It is known that CIA had a hand in reporting Soviet Russia's first atomic explosion. Beyond that, nothing can be pinned down.

Of CIA's organization and routine, little has been officially disclosed. One account is that CIA has five major divisions—three to collect information, one to index information, the fifth to evaluate the information and prepare the CIA's "estimates." These estimates (originated by General Walter Bedell Smith when he



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Agency for the President and other top officers of the government. They arrive daily at the White House, it is said, mimeographed in purple ink and sealed in a blue folder. Other, more extensive estimates are prepared weekly and monthly. These are compiled not merely from the reports of the CIA's espionage agents—the cloak-and-dagger spies of adventure fiction—but more matter-of-factly from the reports of Foreign Service observers, military and naval intelligence officers, immigration officials, narcotics inspectors in far off corners of the world, and employees of the Treasury and Commerce Departments in foreign stations. It has been estimated that about 90 per cent of CIA's work is no more secret than a Carnegie Library, and the bulk of its work lies simply in correlating factual information that is lying around for anyone to pick up.

How many employees this world-wide operation involves, how much they are paid, how well they are doing their jobs, whether the jobs are worth doing—to all of these questions, the CIA stands dumb. Of a few executives, some names and skeleton facts are known. The top brass include:

ALLEN WELSH DULLES, 59, director of the CIA; brother of the Secretary of State, graduate of Princeton and George Washington University, lawyer, in United States diplomatic service, at Vienna, Berne, Berlin, Constantinople, 1916-1926, delegate to international conferences of 1925-'33, attached to OSS in World War II.

SHERMAN KENT, 49, assistant director for national estimates; native of Chicago, graduate of Yale and member of Yale's faculty (professor of history) since 1928; chief of the Europe-Africa Division of OSS, 1941-'45; State Department, 1946; instructor in National War College, 1947; author of *Strategic Intelligence* (1947).

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